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Abstract: We examine the firm performance implications of managers having an incorrect 
representation of their inter-firm task interdependencies in the context of alliance relationships. 
Although uncertainty regarding inter-firm interdependence is common in practice when 
structuring alliances, prior literature provides limited evidence on the firm performance 
implications of such “misspecifications.” We employ a computational model to examine firm 
performance in an alliance context where firms have either under- or over-specified views of 
their inter-firm interdependencies. We find that firm performance declines with greater 
misspecification, with variation in this effect across alliance governance modes and across levels 
of actual interdependence. In addition, we find that interdependence misspecifications have 
differing effects on exploration and coordination, leading to tradeoffs between performance and 
these other non-performance alliance objectives. 
 
Keywords: Strategic alliances; interdependence; coordination; exploration; NK-model 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
The strategic alliance literature points to inter-firm task interdependencies as a key link between 
alliance governance choice and firm performance (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Aggarwal, Siggelkow 
and Singh, 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). Alliances involve the need to coordinate 
interdependencies across organizational boundaries (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1992), as well as the need to select governance mechanisms for inter-firm decision 
making (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015). The nature of inter-firm 
interdependence has been shown to influence governance mode choice (Kale and Puranam, 
2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005) as well as the performance implications of this choice 
(Sampson, 2004; Mayer and Teece, 2008). 
Prescriptive managerial advice stemming from this stream of the extant alliance literature 
generally makes the implicit assumption that in the course of deciding on a mode of governance, 
allying firms are “correct” in their representations of inter-firm interdependencies. In practice, 
however, managers often enter into alliances with an imperfect ex ante understanding of their 
true patterns of inter-firm interdependence (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Doz, 1996). This 
makes selection of a “correct” structure likely to be an unrealistic assumption. Our aim in this 
paper is thus to better understand the implications of relaxing the assumption that managers 
correctly understand inter-firm interdependencies when selecting an alliance governance mode. 
We focus on two forms of such interdependence misspecifications—over-specification and 
under-specification—analyzing how these incorrect managerial representations of inter-firm task 
interdependencies influence firm performance in an alliance setting, under varying 
interdependence and governance mode conditions. 
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A small set of studies lends credence to the notion that managers do not have a fully 
correct understanding of their inter-firm task interdependencies when entering into alliances 
(Doz, 1996; Sosa, Eppinger and Rowles, 2004; Gokpinar, Hopp and Iravani, 2010). Although 
these studies have made important strides in expanding our understanding of the role of 
interdependence misspecifications, relatively little large-sample empirical research has addressed 
this issue (many of these studies are single case-based). One reason for the lack of research on 
this topic is the difficulty in measuring managers’ ex-ante understanding of interdependencies. 
We consequently have very little understanding of the relative performance implications of 
different forms of interdependence misspecifications. To remedy this gap we develop a 
computational model that allows us to simulate managers’ understanding of underlying task 
structures under different scenarios. This approach, we believe, offers a first step in pushing the 
literature toward a deeper understanding of how interdependence misspecifications influence 
firm performance in the context of alternate governance mode choices. 
A key benefit of employing a computational model is that such models naturally 
overcome the limitation of not being able to observe counterfactuals, a critical constraint in 
empirical work. Examining the antecedents of alliance governance choice (e.g., Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 
2005), for example, very often relies on observing only realized transactions. A computational 
modeling approach allows us to develop insights by creating counterfactuals and specifying 
scenarios that are difficult (or impossible) to observe empirically. 
We build on a rich body of work that has used computational methods to develop insights 
into issues in strategy (e.g. Levinthal, 1997). Such an approach enables us to abstract away from 
industry and firm-level factors such as resource complementarity, trust, and prior experience 
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(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002), and to focus instead on isolating the 
performance effects of errors associated with task interdependence structure assessment. In 
particular, we model various task interdependence structures and their associated errors, a goal 
that would not be possible to accomplish with empirical methods alone.
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Our results lead to several sets of insights. First, we find that interdependence 
misspecifications lead to a loss in firm value, with the relative magnitude of this loss varying by 
governance mode. Across-mode differences further suggest that normative advice regarding 
governance mode selection in alliances should be conditional on the relative level of ex-ante 
managerial certainty regarding the nature of inter-firm interdependence. Second, we find that 
increases in the actual (correct) level of interdependence reduce the underperformance penalty 
associated with interdependence misspecifications. Finally, we find that under- and over-
specification influence alliance performance through their effect on the extent of exploration and 
the magnitude of coordination failures experienced by the firms in the alliance. While over-
specification increases both exploration and coordination failures, under-specification decreases 
these two effects.  The relative magnitude of the two effects explains the resulting impact on firm 
performance. When exploration and coordination itself are outcomes of interest in an alliance 
setting, our insights further point to the possibility of a tradeoff between performance and non-
performance outcomes, which may condition alliance governance mode choice. 
In the next section we briefly highlight the literature which serves to motivate and frame 
our research question. In the subsequent sections we detail our computational model and 
associated analyses, with the aim of more deeply understanding the implications of 
                                               
1
 Our study complements recent work examining misspecification of interdependencies in a single firm setting 
(Martignoni, Menon and Siggelkow, 2015). This work differs from ours in important ways, with one key difference 
being that Martignoni et al. (2015) focus on misspecification in a single-firm setting (versus an inter-firm setting 
like ours in which governance mode issues are paramount). 
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interdependence misspecifications for firm performance in an alliance setting. We end by 
discussing the implications of our study for theory and for future research. 
  
MOTIVATING LITERATURE 
  
Alliances are complex inter-organizational relationships with high failure rates (Kale, Dyer and 
Singh, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2009; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). A key challenge in an alliance 
context is governing the joint set of activities of the partnering firms. Recent work on alliance 
governance has underscored the importance of coordination among partner firms as a critical 
determinant of relationship success (e.g, Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 
2005; Reuer and Arino, 2007). Coordination is often necessary as partners must engage in joint 
tasks without the benefits of the structures and systems available in traditional hierarchies (Gulati 
and Singh, 1998). Difficulties arise from decomposing tasks and from ensuring the division of 
labor outside organizational boundaries, and coordination challenges persist even with perfect 
alignment of self-interest among the interacting parties (Heath and Staudenmayer, 2000; 
Kretschmer and Puranam, 2008). 
While firms can address coordination challenges through a variety of mechanisms, 
including the use of detailed contracts that specify tasks, roles and responsibilities (Mayer and 
Argyres, 2004; Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006; Reuer and Arino, 2007), contingency plans and 
responses (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), and information sharing and feedback (Argyres and 
Mayer, 2007), explicit governance mechanisms are an over-arching channel through which 
coordination challenges are often resolved in alliance settings (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Inter-
firm interdependencies influence both the nature of the desired alliance governance structure, as 
well as the consequent performance of the relationship in the context of such a structure (Gulati 
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and Singh, 1998; Mayer and Teece, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2015; 
Kim, Zhao and Anand, 2015). 
What are the implications of employing particular alliance governance structures when 
interdependencies are not correctly understood by managers? Though the literature on this 
question is limited, as the typical assumption is one of perfect knowledge regarding the nature 
and extent of task interdependencies (which in turn dictates appropriate governance structure 
choice), several studies have used case examples to illustrate the consequences of incorrect ex 
ante assessments of such interdependencies (e.g. Doz, 1996; Sosa et al., 2004; Gopkinar et al., 
2010). In a study of the R&D alliance between Ciba Geigy and Alza to develop a drug called 
OROS, for example, Doz (1996) finds that the allying firms started with an incorrect 
understanding of the nature of interdependencies among their underlying tasks. Their assumption 
was that the alliance would involve a simple “handover” of the drug from Alza to Ciba Geigy. In 
reality, however, the alliance required a high level of coordination between the downstream 
functions of both firms. Over the course of the alliance, as the firms realized the need for tighter 
coordination, they then ended up over-specifying the level of interdependence, selecting a 
governance structure that provided greater levels of coordination than actually required. As a 
consequence of the firms’ interdependence misspecifications (and sub-optimal governance 
choices), joint development of the drug was slowed, and the alliance failed to meet its intended 
objectives. 
Under-specified representations of task interdependencies can likewise be problematic. 
Sosa et al. (2004; 2007) address the under-specification issue in their study of a large 
commercial aircraft engine project. They find that a significant number of interdependencies 
between sub-systems were invisible to system architects. As a consequence, system architects 
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did not set up appropriate structures to deal with underlying interdependencies, with the 
misalignment in structure and task interdependence resulting in significant cost and program 
delay. 
Despite the fact that over- or under-specification of inter-firm task interdependencies is 
likely to be common in practice across many types of inter-organizational relationships, there is 
little systematic evidence in the literature (with the exception of a small set of case-based 
examples, two of which we mention above) as to how interdependence misspecification might 
affect the performance of firms, particularly under alternate modes of governing the alliance 
relationship itself. Our methodological approach in this paper, therefore, is to employ a 
computational model to investigate the link between misspecified levels of interdependence and 
alliance performance in a systematic manner. This approach enables us to develop a set of 
theoretical insights that might then serve as the basis for future empirical research. We turn to the 
details of our computational model in the next section. 
 
MODEL 
 
Tasks and interdependencies 
 
We draw on the NK approach to modeling firm decision making (Kauffman, 1993, Levinthal, 
1997), which conceptualizes firms as consisting of a set of inter-related activities, N, that can 
represent various organizational decisions such as those related to firm strategy, organizational 
form, product design, and so forth (Rivkin, 2000).2 The canonical NK model assumes that these 
N activities are interrelated so that a change in one activity affects the payoff to the other K 
activities. Firm performance is based on the unique configuration of these N activities, with the 
                                               
2 We use the term “activities” interchangeably with “choices” and “tasks” throughout this paper. 
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topography (“ruggedness”) of the performance landscape determined by the degree of interaction 
among the firm’s activities (Levinthal, 1997). 
We build on Aggarwal et al. (2011), who extend the canonical NK approach to a two-
firm alliance setting. In this model there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, each of which makes 
decisions over a set of binary activities denoted by    and   . A subset of the activities of each 
firm is considered to be part of the alliance relationship (the “alliance activities”), denoted by   , 
while the remainder of the activities are outside the scope of the alliance (the “non-alliance 
activities”), denoted by   . Firm 1’s activities are thus denoted by            while Firm 2’s 
activities are denoted by           . The two-firm system we model consists of a total of 12 
activities, each of which is denoted by   , with   running from 1 to 12.3 Figure 1 illustrates the 
allocation of each of the    activities to the four activity sets              . For Firm 1, for 
example, the non-alliance activities are represented by                  and the alliance 
activities are represented by           . Interdependencies among particular activities, which 
can be either intra-firm or inter-firm, are indicated with an “X”.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
We then consider five different patterns of interdependence, as illustrated in Figure 2, 
each of which contains a different set of interdependencies among the four activity sets described 
in Figure 1. We select these patterns in order to model the characteristics of a broad range of 
interdependence forms. The patterns not only increase in the overall level of interdependence, 
but each successive pattern introduces a particular class of interdependence among the activity 
sets               (e.g., going from Pattern 1 to Pattern 2 introduces interdependencies within 
the alliance activities) so that we can more easily isolate the implications of interdependencies of 
                                               
3 This value for N is consistent with prior NK literature (e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007; Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
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different types. While these patterns are certainly not exhaustive, they collectively enable us to 
conduct a set of analyses that can generate insights into the mechanisms underlying our core 
research question around the impact of interdependence misspecifications. 
Pattern 1, which we refer to as fully decomposable, has interactions only within each of 
the four activity subsets              : the activities within the    subset only affect other 
activities in   , and the same holds for activities within              In Pattern 2, pure alliance 
interaction, we introduce interactions within each of the sets of alliance activities of both the 
firms (i.e., within    and   ). In Pattern 3, firm own-alliance interaction, we introduce 
interactions within the firm’s own non-alliance and alliance activities so that activities within    
interact with activities within   , and activities within    interact with activities within   . In 
Pattern 4, firm partner-alliance interaction, the alliance activities of one firm interact with the 
non-alliance activities of the partner (activities within    interact with activities within   , and 
activities within    interact with those of   ). And finally, for Pattern 5, full interdependence, 
there is complete interdependence, with all activities interacting with one other. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Performance landscapes 
 
Each unique configuration of the N activities in the two-firm system (in which, as discussed 
above, the full set of N activities is divided into the subsets              ) has associated with 
it a particular performance level. To create the performance landscape we follow the standard 
approach in the NK literature (e.g. Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin 2000): for each of the N activities,   , 
in the system, we define a contribution value function   . Each    takes as parameters the state 
(either 0 or 1) of   , together with the state of the    other policies with which    interacts (these 
interactions are defined, as described above, by the interaction matrix associated with the 
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particular interdependence pattern being considered), and is initialized with a value drawn at 
random from a uniform        distribution for each possible combination of the various states of 
   and its    interacting policies. The set of N contribution value functions    is defined at the 
outset, and remains unchanged as the simulation progresses. 
The overall performance of the entire two-firm system for any given configuration of 
activities    (i.e., the N-dimensional vector of    values) is the sum of the N    values for that 
particular configuration i.e. ∑   
 
   . We can define the performance of Firm 1 for a given  
  as 
the sum of the contribution values of the activities specific to the firm itself, plus a portion,  , of 
the alliance activities (we set       throughout). The performance of Firm 1, for example is 
∑   ( 
 )    ∑   ( 
 )    
 
   . To reduce statistical artifacts we follow the commonly employed 
approach in the NK literature in which the reported performance values are normalized by 
dividing the raw performance by the performance value at the highest peak in the landscape (see 
e.g., Rivkin and Siggelkow [2003]). 
 
Interdependence misspecifications 
 
Modeling misspecifications in managerial representations of task interdependencies requires that 
we model not only the true underlying interaction matrix among the firms, but also that we 
model the misspecified representation of the interaction matrix that is taken into account by 
managers as they make decisions. We do so by modeling two matrices, with the true matrix used 
to determine the actual performance that managers observe as a consequence of their choices, 
and the misspecified matrix used to determine the choice that managers actually make as they 
search the landscape. 
 More formally, we define two interaction matrices. The first interaction matrix,   , 
represents the true structure of the underlying pattern of inter-firm task interdependence, and is 
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used to determine the performance landscape as discussed in the prior section. The second 
interaction matrix,   , represents firms’ own representation of the inter-firm task 
interdependencies, and can differ from the true matrix  . The performance landscape for    is 
derived from the true performance landscape    to ensure that the (potentially misspecified) 
performance values are correlated with the true performance values via the processes described 
later in this section.  
Firms search by evaluating alternatives and making choices with respect to their activities 
based on a set of governance structures which we describe in a subsequent section. In the process 
of evaluating alternatives and making changes to their activities   , the firms take into account 
performance values as determined by the (misspecified) interdependence matrix,   . Once a 
choice is made in any given period, however, the performance that firms actually experience is 
defined by performance values stemming from the (true) interdependence matrix,   . While 
searching for high performing configurations, firms compare the performance values of the 
alternatives based on the    matrix with the observed performance of the current configuration 
based on the   matrix.   
Firms are said to have an under-specified view when the misspecified matrix    has a 
lower degree of interdependence than the true matrix   ; and firms are said to have an over-
specified view when the misspecified matrix    has a higher degree of interdependence than the 
true matrix   . For the purpose of our analysis we will consider misspecifications that differ by 
a single pattern difference as defined by the patterns in Figure 2. As an example, with a true 
Pattern 3 interdependence matrix (i.e., where    is based on Pattern 3), under-specification is 
defined as a situation where there is an   based on Pattern 2, while over-specification is defined 
as a situation where there is an   based on Pattern 4.  
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In the remainder of this section we discuss the processes for calculating the performance 
values of the landscapes as a function of the under- or over-specification of the    pattern. The 
performance levels for    (whether under- or over-specified) are derived from the    
performance levels. To accomplish this we first define the performance landscape for    via the 
process described in the previous section; and we then derive the performance landscapes for the 
under- and over-specified cases using the procedures described next. 
Under-specified interdependence matrix   . What is the procedure we use to construct 
a performance landscape for an under-specified matrix? The performance values of the under-
specified landscape should be correlated with the true landscape in such a way that the under-
specified landscape appears to be a slightly “blurry” (or less rugged) version of the true 
landscape. How do we accomplish this? When the matrix    is under-specified, each decision 
   is affected by  ̅  other decisions, with  ̅  <   , where    is the number of interdependencies 
associated with    in the true matrix   . In order to calculate the performance landscape for    
we take averages of the contribution values from the true interaction matrix    for each fixed 
configuration of    and its  ̅  interacting choices, an approach consistent with Gavetti and 
Levinthal (2000). 
We can illustrate this process with an example. Assume that in the true matrix    a 
particular activity    interacts with activities   ,   , and   . Also assume that in the 
misspecified matrix    the activity    is represented by managers as interacting only with 
activity   . The performance landscape   thus requires that we generate contribution values for 
each unique combination of the    and    activities. For ease of notation, let    refer to the 
contribution value function for activity    for the true matrix   . Furthermore, let the four 
arguments of   ( ) refer to the states (which can be either 0 or 1) of each of the activities    
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through   . Thus   (       ) refers to the contribution value assigned to the true (  ) matrix for 
activity    where activities    through    are all set to 0. In our example, we would define the 
contribution values for    in the misspecified matrix    for each of the four possible 
configurations of the    and    activities as follows: 
     and     : Average {  (       )   (       )   (       )   (       )  
 
     and     : Average {  (       )   (       )   (       )   (       )  
 
     and     : Average {  (       )   (       )   (       )   (       )  
 
     and     : Average {  (       )   (       )   (       )   (       )  
 
Over-specified interdependence matrix   . Having discussed the procedure for 
constructing an under-specified performance landscape, we turn next to the procedure for 
constructing the performance values of an over-specified landscape. In this case, rather than 
being a slightly “blurry” (or less rugged) version of the true landscape (as it was in the under-
specified case), the over-specified landscape can be thought of as a more “granular” (or more 
rugged) version of the true landscape. 
How do we accomplish this? When the matrix    is over-specified, each activity    is 
affected by  ̿  other activities, with  ̿  >    (where    is the number of interdependencies 
associated with    in the true matrix   ). This implies that for each unique combination of 
   and the    other activities affecting it in the baseline    matrix, there are  
  ̿     additional 
contribution values in the   matrix that must be created to account for the additional   matrix 
interdependencies. To generate these additional contribution values we follow the following 
process. First, we generate    ̿       random numbers    from the uniform distribution       , 
where   is    (       ), and    is the particular contribution value for    for the specific 
configuration of    and the    other policies affecting it (note that    is based on the    function 
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that defines the landscape for the    matrix). Second, for each random number    we generate 
two contribution values            and           . Finally, we randomly assign      and 
     to the additional  
  ̿     activity combinations for which we need the additional contribution 
values. Constructing the landscape for the over-specified matrix in this way allows us to ensure 
that the true and misspecified landscapes are correlated with one another in the same way as they 
are in the under-specified case. More specifically: under-specifying (by one pattern) an over-
specified (by one pattern) landscape results in the original (correct) landscape. 
We can illustrate the over-specification procedure with an example. Assume that in the 
true matrix   the activity    interacts with    and   , while in the over-specified representation 
  , in addition to these interactions there are two additional interactions, with activities    and 
  . In this case it is necessary to define four additional contribution values for each possible 
configuration of   ,    and   . In the case where the activity configuration of (  ,     ) is 
(1,0,0), for example, we need to construct contribution values for activity    where the 
(              ) values take on the following set of four possible configurations: (1,0,0,0,0), 
(1,0,0,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). To do this we start with      (     ). That is, we start 
with   , which is the specific contribution value in the    matrix for the    activity where the 
configuration of (        ) is (1,0,0). We define      (       ), and then generate two 
error terms     and    from the uniform distribution       . These two error terms then allow us 
to generate the four contribution values               ,              ,               , and 
            , which we then assign at random to the four configurations noted above, 
(1,0,0,0,0), (1,0,0,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and (1,0,0,1,1). E.g., if   
  (              ) represents the 
function that maps the particular configuration of    through    to a particular contribution value 
for    in the    matrix, then after generating the contribution values through the process 
15 
 
described above, the random allocation could generate the following:   
  (         )     ; 
  
  (         )     ;   
  (         )     ; and   
  (         )     . 
 
Governance modes 
 
We turn next to the governance modes that determine how agents in our model search the 
performance landscape. We draw on Aggarwal et al. (2011), considering four governance modes 
that represent varying points along the spectrum of alliance integration (Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). At the opposite 
ends of the spectrum we have what we refer to as the modular and integrated modes of 
governance. As hybrid forms we consider what we refer to as the self-governing alliance and 
ratification modes. We describe each of these modes in detail in the remainder of this section. 
In the modular mode of governance both firms make choices simultaneously within a 
given period and only consider the profits associated with the particular activities within their 
scope. We model a 12 activity system, with performance values normalized by the total value of 
the system at the highest peak of the landscape (performance at the landscape peak is denoted by 
  ). In the modular mode Firms 1 and 2 control their respective alliance and non-alliance 
activities independently, with each firm thus controlling 6 of the 12 activities in the system. In 
each period Firm 1 evaluates alternatives for activities              based on the expected 
value of the configuration stemming from   , comparing these alternatives against the realized 
performance from the prior period as determined by   , and selecting a choice if it increases 
their expected performance. Firm 2 does the same for its own set of policy choices. 
More precisely, in the modular mode, Firm 1 evaluates alternatives based on its expected 
profit, ∑   
  ( ̅ )
 
     
 , comparing this against the prior period realized performance, 
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∑   
  ( ̅   )
 
     
 . Similarly, Firm 2 evaluates its alternatives based on its expected profit 
∑   
  ( ̅ )
  
     
 , comparing this against ∑   
  ( ̅   )
  
     
 . In this notation   
   and   
   
respectively represent the contribution values for activity    based on the    and     matrices 
respectively. Vector  ̅  refers to the configuration of the activities being evaluated in the current 
period, while vector  ̅    refers to the existing configuration of activities, as of the end of the 
prior period. Firm 1 and Firm 2 can change up to two activities in any given period, and agents 
for each firm evaluate all possible alternatives when making decisions in a given period. For 
each agent, and for each alternative being considered by each agent, the vector  ̅ , which 
represents the vector being evaluated by the agent, is thus allowed to differ from the prior 
round’s realized configuration  ̅    by up to two activities. 4 
While the modular mode can be conceptualized as a simple case of an arms-length 
relationship where both firms work independently with full control of their activities, the 
integrated mode lies at the other end of the spectrum. In the integrated mode Firms 1 and 2 
operate as a single entity that makes decisions with respect to all 12 policy choices. Examples of 
integrated governance structures can be found in long-term equity-based alliances where 
decision making is fully integrated, and where firms behave as if they were a single entity (e.g., 
the alliance between Renault and Nissan, in which there is an integrated governance structure 
under a single leadership).  
                                               
4 Prior work has parameterized the number of activities that can be changed in any given period, as well as the 
number of alternatives considered, referring to these values as “search radius” and “alternatives” (Siggelkow and 
Rivkin [2005]; Aggarwal et al. [2011]). In our study we hold these parameters constant, allowing each agent to have 
a search radius of 2, and to evaluate all possible alternatives associated with this search radius in any given period. 
We thus map to what Aggarwal et al. (2011) refer to as “Capability Level D”. Our results and insights, however, are 
qualitatively similar and robust to variation in these parameters. For ease of exposition we report all results based on 
these fixed settings of “search radius” and “alternatives.”  Results on alternative settings are available upon request. 
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In our model of the integrated mode, the single agent takes into account the total 
combined profit of Firms 1 and 2 when evaluating alternatives, comparing this against the profit 
from the prior round’s full configuration. Formally, the quasi-integrated entity evaluates 
alternatives based on ∑   
  ( ̅ )
  
     
 , comparing these against ∑   
  ( ̅   )
  
     
 , where 
 ̅  is the vector being evaluated, which differs from the prior round’s configuration  ̅    by up to 
two activities. Though profit is calculated at the level of the system, we can also report profit for 
each firm; since the firms are symmetric in our analyses, profit for each individual firm is simply 
½ of the the profit of the entire system. 
In addition to the modular and integrated governance modes which lie on opposite ends 
of the governance spectrum, we consider two hybrid modes: self-governing alliance and 
ratification, in line with Aggarwal et al. (2011). In both cases the alliance function is managed 
independently by a third agent (e.g., a joint committee formed by both firms to manage the 
alliance). The agents for Firms 1 and 2 are responsible solely for their respective non-alliance 
activities (   through    and    through     respectively), but in the process of evaluating 
alternatives and making decisions each takes into account their individual total profit, which for 
each firm is defined as the profit of the firm’s non-alliance activities plus a portion,  , of the 
profit from the alliance activities (we set       throughout).  The alliance agent considers 
profit from only the alliance activities (i.e.,    through   ) when evaluating alternatives and 
making decisions. 
More precisely, with the self-governing alliance and ratification modes, in each period 
the Firm 1, Firm 2, and Alliance agents each make the following comparisons when evaluating 
alternatives, with each agent able to make up to two changes to the (four) activities under each of 
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their individual purview (i.e., in each case the N-dimensional vector of binary values  ̅  differs 
from  ̅    by at most two activities): 
Firm 1 compares:  ∑   
  ( ̅ )
 
     
      ∑   
  ( ̅ )
 
     
  
 
against: ∑   
  ( ̅   )
 
     
  +    ∑   
  ( ̅   )
 
     
  
 
Firm 2 compares:  ∑   
  ( ̅ )
  
     
      ∑   
  ( ̅ )
 
     
   
 
against: ∑   
  ( ̅   )
  
      
  +    ∑   
  ( ̅   )
 
     
  
 
Alliance compares:  ∑   
  ( ̅ )
 
     
   
 
against: ∑   
  ( ̅   )
 
     
  
 
Although the way the self-governing alliance and ratification modes compare alternatives 
is the same, the two modes differ in the level of independence and degree of oversight over the 
alliance agent. In the self-governing alliance mode, the alliance agent operates independently, 
without any oversight from the firms. In any given period the alliance agent makes its decisions. 
Firms 1 and 2 then select their policies simultaneously, taking into account the policy choice 
made by the alliance agent. 
In the ratification mode, by contrast, in any given period the Firm 1 and Firm 2 agents 
decide on their activity set changes, followed by the alliance agent. Firm 1 and Firm 2 then have 
veto power over the activity changes suggested by the alliance agent. That is, before 
implementing any activity change, the alliance agent needs to have its proposed change ratified 
by the agents of the two firms. Ratification requires that both firms accept the proposed policy 
change, with a firm accepting any proposed policy change only if it does not reduce the firm’s 
own profit. 
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ANALYSIS 
 
We model a 12-policy choice system of two firms, with four activity subsets              , 
sub-divided as depicted in Figure 1, and with patterns of interdependence as depicted in Figure 2. 
The model is symmetric for both firms such that the performance results of each are equal when 
run over a large number of landscapes. We thus focus on analyzing the difference in overall 
performance of the two-firm alliance system under varying combinations of interdependence 
pattern and governance structure. We are interested in situations of over- or under-specification, 
which we define as a single pattern higher or lower, respectively in interdependence (for 
example, with the patterns in Figure 2, over-specification for Pattern 3 would be Pattern 4, while 
under-specification for Pattern 3 would be Pattern 2). We assume that both firms and the alliance 
agent (in the case of self-governing alliance and ratification) have the same misspecified view of 
the underlying task structure. Each time period in the simulation consists of agents making a set 
of decisions with respect to their activities (per the mode governing their decisions as described 
in the previous section). We run the simulation for 200 periods on a particular landscape in order 
to observe the long-run performance of firms in the system, and then take an average over 10,000 
different simulation runs in order to minimize the effects of any statistical artifacts. 
 
Performance implications of over- and under-specification  
 
As a starting point for our analysis we compare long-term performance outcomes, i.e. 
performance at the end of period 200, for the alliance system in the case of misspecification to 
the case where all the agents in the system have a correct understanding of their task 
interdependencies. We refer to the percentage decline in overall performance as the “value-loss” 
due to the misspecification of task interdependence. 
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Over-specified case. We begin with the situation where the firm agents (and alliance 
agent in the case of the self-governing alliance and ratification modes) have an over-specified 
view of the underlying task structure. We consider performance for the four different forms of 
governance under the various interdependence patterns. Table 1A compares the performance 
outcomes of the four governance modes under Patterns 1 through 4 for firms with the over-
specified view. We find that the average long-run performance for firms with an over-specified 
view decreases for all patterns. Pattern 1 has a lower value loss compared to the rest of patterns, 
due primarily to the difference in the additional number of interdependencies agents consider in 
the search landscape.
5
 Moving on to the rest of the patterns, we find that the overall value loss 
decreases as we move from Pattern 2 to Pattern 4. For example, for the modular governance 
mode, the overall value loss is -18.6% for Pattern 2 as compared to -14.8% for Pattern 4. 
Similarly, for the self-governing alliance mode the overall value loss is -15.0% for Pattern 2 
whereas it is -4.6% for Pattern 4. Further, for the ratification mode the overall value loss is -
18.8% for Pattern 2, while it is -8.3% for Pattern 4. For the integrated mode the overall value 
loss is -20.0% for Pattern 2 and -11.3% for Pattern 4.  
Our findings on the effects of over-specification are consistent with intuition. The overall 
loss in value for the firm with an over-specified view is directly linked to the error introduced 
into the search process as a consequence of the over-specification. For example, in the case of 
Pattern 1, while searching for higher performance the firm assumes that the alliance activities of 
the two firms are interdependent, impacting its performance. In reality, however, the underlying 
task is fully decomposable, with no interdependence between the alliance activities of the two 
                                               
5
 Pattern 1 differs from other patterns with respect to the total number of interdependencies that the agents consider 
in their search landscape (an additional 8 interdependencies with an over-specified view). For the other patterns the 
search landscape has an additional 32 interdependencies. 
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firms. This misspecification of interdependence leads to an error in the search process, 
decreasing performance. 
Under-specified case. We turn next to examining how under-specification affects the 
performance of both firms. Table 1B shows performance outcomes of the various modes under 
Patterns 2 through 5 for firms with the under-specified view. We find that under-specification 
leads to lower performance on average. Similar to the over-specification results we find that 
Pattern 2 has a lower value loss compared to the other patterns with under-specification, 
primarily due to the difference in the characteristics of interdependencies that agents consider to 
be missing in the case of Pattern 2 and the other patterns.
6
 
In the under-specified case we also find that the overall value loss decreases as we move 
from Pattern 3 to Pattern 5.  In fact, for Pattern 5, we find that the overall performance increases 
for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. For example, in the case of the modular 
governance mode, the overall value loss is -19.1% for Pattern 3 as compared to a 7.8% gain for 
Pattern 5. Similarly, the overall value loss for Pattern 3 in the case of the self-governing alliance 
is -17.3%, while it is -1.0% for Pattern 5. For other modes the overall value losses for Pattern 2 
with the ratification and integrated modes are -15.6% and -21.6% respectively, while they are -
2.5% and -9.5% for Pattern 5 with the ratification and integrated modes.  
We can then observe the governance structure that provides the highest performance level 
when agents have the correct view as compared to when they have a misspecified view. 
Interestingly, we find that misspecification of task structure often results in a different 
governance mode providing the optimal level performance. For example, the integrated 
                                               
6
 Firms consider a total of 8 interdependencies within the alliance agent to be missing when considering the under-
specified view of Pattern 2. For the rest of the patterns, firms consider their search landscape to have 32 fewer 
interdependencies as compared to that of the true landscape.  
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governance mode provides the highest performance for Pattern 4 when firms have the correct 
view, while the self-governing alliance mode provides the highest performance with both under- 
and over- specified views. On average, we find that the self-governing alliance mode provides 
the highest performance across patterns for both forms of misspecification (Pattern 1 with the 
over-specified view is an exception where the modular governance mode performs better). We 
turn to the mechanisms driving these results in the next section.  
[INSERT TABLES 1A AND 1B HERE] 
Coordination failures and exploration as intermediate explanatory mechanisms 
 
To more deeply understand the reasons for the differences in value loss among the various 
interdependence pattern-governance mode combinations, we turn next to the mechanisms that 
may influence firm performance in an alliance setting, building on Aggarwal et al.’s (2011) 
discussion of the role of coordination and exploration in influencing the performance effects of 
alliance governance. Figure 3 illustrates the over-arching conceptual framework we explore in 
the remainder of this section: coordination failures and exploration achieved are intermediate 
measures that link misspecification, governance mode and level of interdependence with firm 
performance in an alliance setting. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
  
 Why do we focus in particular on the dimensions of coordination and exploration? 
Coordination concerns are pervasive in an alliance context (Litwalk and Hylton, 1962), 
influencing governance mode decisions (Gulati and Singh, 1998). The ability to effectively 
coordinate activities among alliance partners, moreover, influences alliance performance (Zollo, 
Reuer and Singh, 2002; Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005). In addition to effective 
coordination, exploration is a key determinant of alliance performance as well (Child, 2001; 
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Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). We thus aim to understand how 
interdependence misspecifications, together with governance modes and actual patterns of 
interdependence, link to firm performance via the mediating effects of coordination and 
exploration. 
Constructing the intermediate measures of coordination and exploration. We construct 
the measure, coordination failures, which we define, in any given period, to be the total number 
of incidences up to and including the current period in which firms (in total) experience a profit 
decline as compared to the previous period due to simultaneous decision making by the two 
firms.  Total (Firm 1 + Firm 2) profit can decline both because of simultaneous movement of the 
agents, as well as because of errors in the search process due to landscape misspecification. We 
isolate the former by stripping out situations of search-related error.7 For our analyses in this 
paper we consider coordination failures at period 200, which is the point at which the two-firm 
system has reached a steady-state level of performance. 
We also construct the measure exploration achieved by calculating the total number of 
unique contribution values (  ’s) evaluated by the agents in the system over time, normalized by 
the total number of possible contribution values that exist for the given landscape (Aggarwal et 
al., 2011).8 The evaluated and total contribution values used as inputs to our exploration 
achieved measure come from the true landscape (  ), and are based on the agents’ search 
history on the misspecified landscape (  ). More precisely, for each policy configuration 
                                               
7 Due to differences in the contribution values between the search (  ) and true (  ) landscapes, configurations 
leading to high performance on the search landscape may not lead to high performance on the true landscape. An 
agent using a misspecified landscape for search may commit to a policy configuration that can lead to a decline in 
performance on the true landscape. We refer to this decline in performance due to differences in contribution values 
between the true and search landscapes as “search-related error.” We strip out such search-related errors from the 
measure of coordination failures so that the measure reflects only situations where agents simultaneously make a 
choice that may be correct for each firm individually, but that ends up being performance reducing for the total 
profits of both firms as a whole. 
8 For instance, the total number of possible contribution values for Pattern 1 is 144, and for Pattern 5 it is 49,152.   
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evaluated by the agents on the search landscape (  ) up to and including the focal period, we 
take the corresponding configuration on the true landscape (  ) and identify whether the 
contribution values for that policy configuration, as derived from the    landscape, have been 
considered by the agents in the search process up to and including the focal period.9 We count 
the total number of such cases where a particular contribution value has been evaluated, and 
divide this by the total number of distinct contribution values based on   . As we do with 
coordination failures, we consider exploration achieved in the steady-state at period 200. 
 Implications of over-specification for intermediate measures. How does over-
specification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and exploration? In the 
over-specified case the landscape searched by the agents becomes more rugged than that of the 
true landscape. Additionally, values of adjacent locations on the landscape are less correlated as 
compared to that of the true landscape. This increases the number of alternatives the agent 
considers, as well as the duration of the search process before an agent locks itself into a policy 
configuration. While this increase in the number of alternatives considered leads to a higher 
degree of exploration achieved, the increase in search time also leads to higher levels of 
coordination failure. With multiple agents searching the landscape at the same time, the chances 
of coordination failure increases as policies selected by one agent may not be optimal for the 
other. The degree of coordination failures between agents thus depends on the duration over 
which agents search the landscape simultaneously. 
                                               
9 Note that any given policy configuration will exist on both landscapes (M0 and M1). However, whether or not the 
corresponding contribution values are “distinct” is a function of the interdependence structure of that landscape 
(which of course differs between M0 and M1). As an example, suppose we take a simple system in where there are 
only two possible binary policy choices {d1, d2}. When an agent evaluates the move from the existing policy 
configuration {0,0} to a new policy configuration {0,1}, the number of distinct contribution values she considers 
will differ depending on whether the two policy choices are interdependent or not. If they are interdependent, then 
there would be two unique contribution values, C1(0,1) and C2(0,1),  which would be taken into account; if they are 
not interdependent, then only one unique contribution value, C2(0,1) would need to be considered. 
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 We report the results of the effect of over-specification on exploration achieved and 
coordination failures in the middle two columns of Table 2A (falling under the heading 
“symmetric view”). As in Table 1 we compare the performance metric (in this case exploration 
achieved or coordination failures) for the misspecified case relative to the correctly-specified 
case at the end of period 200. The table shows that the overall degree of exploration achieved by 
the agents increases with the over-specified view. Furthermore, the effect of over-specification is 
more prominent at patterns with a higher degree of interdependence, and with the modular and 
self-governing alliance modes. In addition, agents with the over-specified view face a higher 
level of coordination failure. For example, under Patterns 3 and 4 with the self-governing 
alliance mode, coordination failures increase by 3.5% and 1.6% respectively.  
 Implications of under-specification for intermediate measures. How does under-
specification affect the intermediate measures of coordination failures and exploration? In the 
under-specified case the search space for the agent is simplified. The agent searches on a 
landscape with a lower degree of interdependence that is consequently less rugged as compared 
to the true landscape. Each policy on the search landscape corresponds to a cluster of policies on 
the actual landscape. This simplification of the search landscape speeds the agent’s search 
processes (e.g., Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), enabling the agent to relatively quickly identify a 
peak with respect to its search landscape. Thus, the degree of exploration achieved with the 
underspecified-view decreases, as Table 2B (middle two columns, under the heading “symmetric 
view”) reports. The increase in search speed is particularly helpful in reducing coordination 
failures: with an increase in search speed agents identify optimal performance configurations 
with relatively fewer activity changes, reducing the overall number of associated coordination 
failures.  
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[INSERT TABLES 2A AND 2B HERE] 
 
Concordance with conceptual framework. Having discussed the implications of 
misspecification for coordination and exploration, we now return to Figure 3, with the aim of 
testing the conceptual framework depicted there. To do so we construct a dataset based on our 
simulation results at period 200 with 320,000 observations: we run 10,000 trials for each 
combination of misspecification-pattern-governance mode combination; and we then employ 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUREG) to analyze the results, using the framework depicted in 
Figure 3. We estimate three equations simultaneously: (1) the impact of misspecification on 
exploration achieved; (2) the impact of misspecification on coordination failures; and (3) the 
impact of exploration achieved and coordination failures on total performance. Seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUREG) allows for correlation between the error terms of these equations 
(Zellner, 1962, 1963), a likely situation given the approach used to construct our dataset. 
In our SUREG models the variable, misspecification, takes the value of one when the 
observation is under a misspecified view, and 0 otherwise. We estimate models for over- and 
under- specification separately. To control for the effects of patterns and governance modes we 
include dummy variables for these factors. The modular governance mode is used as the base 
mode against which to compare the effects of the other modes; and Pattern 2 is used as the base 
pattern against which to compare the effects of the other patterns.
10
 
Estimated standardized coefficients for the two models (over- and under-specified) are 
reported in Table 3. We do not show p-values of the estimated coefficients to avoid redundancy, 
as all the p-values are less than 0.001 (with the exception of the effect of misspecification on 
                                               
10
 Since we do not have any observations for Pattern 1 in the case of the under-specified view, and for Pattern 5 in 
the case of the over-specified view, we use Pattern 2 as the base pattern, as it is common across both forms of 
misspecification.  
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coordination failures in the case of the over-specified view). As Model 1 shows, the coefficient 
of misspecification on exploration is positive, suggesting that over-specification of task structure 
is associated with higher exploration. On average, firms with the over-specified view tend to 
explore more by 0.10 standard deviation. Similarly, in Model 2, the coefficient of 
misspecification on coordination failures is negative, suggesting that under-specification is 
associated with fewer coordination failures. Though we do not find statistically significant 
effects of over-specification on coordination failures, we do find that under-specification 
increases coordination failures by 0.19 standard deviations. Furthermore, consistent with earlier 
research we find that the coefficient of exploration on overall performance is positive, and the 
coefficient of coordination failures on overall performance is negative, for both Model 1 and 
Model 2. We find that a standard deviation increase in coordination failures decreases overall 
performance by -0.21 and -0.37 standard deviations for over- and under-specification 
respectively. Similarly we find that a standard deviation increase in exploration increases overall 
performance by 0.38 and 0.45 standard deviations for over- and under-specification respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Implications for governance mode choice: asymmetric view 
 
In a final set of analyses we consider the situation in which only one partner has either an under- 
or over-specified view. The results of the “asymmetric” perspective on coordination and 
exploration outcomes are shown in the right two columns of Tables 2A and 2B (under the 
heading “asymmetric view”). The asymmetric view is one in which the focal firm has the correct 
representation, while the partner has the misspecified view. These results help address the 
question of what governance mode managers should choose (or rather, negotiate for ex ante), 
conditional on their assessment of their partners’ likely representation of interdependencies. 
28 
 
As Table 2A suggests, if managers believe their partner to be over-specified, higher 
levels of exploration can be obtained by selecting the modular governance mode, and 
coordination failures can be minimized by selecting the self-governing alliance mode. If on the 
other hand managers believe their partner to be under-specified, as Table 2B illustrates, they can 
minimize exploration losses by using the modular mode when in a lower interdependence 
situation (Patterns 2 and 3) and by using the ratification mode when in a higher interdependence 
situation (Patterns 4 and 5). Governance choice thus depends on managers’ understanding of 
their task structure, their partner’s level of misspecification, and the ultimate objectives of the 
alliance (whether this is firm performance itself, achieving high levels of exploration, or 
avoiding coordination failures). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our aim in this paper was to use a computational model to understand the implications of 
incorrect managerial representations of inter-firm task interdependencies in the context of 
alliance relationships, focusing on the effects of under- and over-specification under varying 
combinations of true inter-firm task interdependence and modes of alliance governance. We 
derive three sets of results. 
First, we find that managerial misspecification of interdependence structures leads to a 
decline in firm performance, a result consistent with prior case-based work (Doz [1996]; Sosa et 
al. [2007]). Our results suggest a number of interesting nuances. We find that while over- and 
under-specification of interdependence have similar effects on performance, the degree of value 
loss due to misspecification varies by governance mode. The decline in performance is on 
average lower for the modular and self-governing alliance modes. This difference in the effect of 
misspecification on various governance modes has important implications. When both firms 
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have a correct understanding of their interdependencies, the integrated mode provides better 
performance at patterns with higher interdependence (Patterns 4 and 5). As we relax the 
assumption of a correct understanding, however, we find that the self-governing alliance mode 
provides better performance than the integrated mode. The degree to which firms have an 
understanding of their underlying interdependencies is thus important in deciding on the optimal 
mode of governance. 
A second set of results is that the pattern of interdependence has a crucial impact on the 
level of decline in alliance performance due to misspecification. Interestingly, the decline in 
performance decreases with an increase in the degree of interdependence in the underlying task 
structure.  As illustrated in Tables 1A and 1B, the value loss for the alliance is lowest with 
Patterns 4 and 5 for both forms of misspecification. We are able to explain these results using the 
intermediate measures of coordination and exploration. 
Our analysis of these intermediate measures leads to our final set of conclusions, which 
relates to the possibly competing objectives relating to coordination and exploration. Our study 
lends insight into the consequences of misspecification for these two objectives, as we find that 
the two forms of misspecification affect each differently. The overall level of exploration 
achieved by the alliance increases with an over-specified view; in the case of an under-specified 
view, however, the overall exploration level decreases (though with a few exceptions for low 
complexity patterns). Similarly, we find that coordination failures increase when both firms share 
an over-specified view. Although in the case of the under-specified view coordination failures 
are limited, they decline at higher levels of interdependence. This presents an interesting trade-
off between paying attention to firm performance versus other alliance objectives such as 
exploration. Firms with an over-specified view of interdependence may achieve higher 
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exploration, yet trade this off with lower performance. Likewise, with higher levels of 
interdependence firms can take on an under-specified view in order to achieve fewer 
coordination failures. 
From a managerial perspective our results underscore the importance of paying attention 
to task interdependencies when structuring alliances.  Decision makers should, in particular, 
make attempts to identify the true structure of their inter-firm interdependence. While estimating 
ex ante the magnitude and direction of misspecification may be difficult, managers may be able 
to reduce the magnitude of such errors by investing in efforts to identify the true interdependence 
structures in alliances: e.g., pre-alliance discussions and alliance management capabilities can 
help reduce the likelihood of any misspecifications. Such investments in understanding the true 
structure become particularly important because, as our results suggest, firms’ task structure 
representations are significant inputs to the choice of alliance governance mode. 
Before concluding we discuss some of the assumptions embedded in our model, and their 
implications for our results. First, our model assumes that both firms are symmetric with respect 
to their views on interdependence. However, it may not be uncommon to have an alliance where 
both partners have different views of their interdependencies. We conducted robustness checks 
to understand the implications of this assumption. As noted in our discussion of coordination and 
exploration, we evaluated an ‘asymmetric view’ scenario in which only one of the partner firms 
has an incorrect view of their interdependence. The overall performance implications were 
consistent with our main findings, with the magnitude of value loss decreasing when only one 
partner has an incorrect understanding.  
As a second assumption embedded in our analysis, note that we pre-specify firms’ 
understanding regarding their interdependence structure, and assume that this remains constant 
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for the entire period (i.e., there is no learning by agents about the true nature of their 
interdependence). It is likely, however, that firms update their understanding based on feedback 
received over the course of the alliance. While our purpose in the present paper was solely to 
examine the implications of relaxing the assumption of a correct specification of inter-firm task 
interdependencies (a gap that the literature has not yet addressed), it would be a natural extension 
to relax this assumption and to extend our model in order to study how the process of learning 
about interdependencies over time (and possibly modifying the alliance governance structure 
accordingly) influences our results.   
As a final assumption, note that we use a pre-defined set of patterns of interdependence to 
represent task structures and firms’ understanding of these structures. The current patterns 
represent discrete points on the continuum of increasing task complexity. These patterns 
characterize ideal configuration types that are useful for exposition; hybrid patterns may arise in 
reality, however, and future research might thus examine such patterns. We did run our results 
using a “random K” scenario to evaluate the implications of increasing levels of 
interdependence, where these interdependencies were randomly scattered throughout the task 
matrix. The results on this analysis were broadly consistent with our findings. 
Our paper leads to a number of implications for work in the area of alliance governance. 
While the issue of governance structure choice has been examined both implicitly and explicitly 
in the alliance literature, with significant progress being made using empirical indicators, ours is 
the first effort to attempt to understand the implications of relaxing the common assumption that 
managers operate with a “true” representation of inter-firm interdependencies. Because in 
practice managers are unlikely to have perfect ex ante representations of their interdependencies, 
as we discuss up-front with the example from Doz (1996), such an assumption is likely to be 
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unrealistic. Using empirical methods alone, however, is unlikely to allow to us fully address the 
implications of interdependence misspecifications, as empirical data is unlikely to be structured 
so as to allow simultaneous and deep observation of managerial representations, 
interdependencies, and governance structures. As a consequence, computational modeling 
provides an effective tool with which to examine the implications of managerial errors in 
interdependence representations in a structured way. The insights we gain from our model can 
complement future empirical work, and more importantly serve to inform the core theorizing that 
can guide these future empirical examinations of this topic. 
In conclusion, we make an important set of contributions to the literature on alliance 
governance by highlighting how a partial understanding of task interdependencies can be 
detrimental for alliance performance. We go beyond prior work to explicitly study the effect of 
errors on various patterns of interdependence, a task that would be difficult to accomplish using 
empirical methods alone. In so doing we contribute to the literature on governance choice (e.g. 
Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), shedding new insights into the link between 
interdependence, governance modes, and firm performance in alliance settings, and offering a 
promising set of avenues for future research. 
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Figure 1. Interaction matrix example 
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Note: This example corresponds to “Pattern 1” as described in Figure 2 
  
36 
 
Figure 2. Patterns of interdependence 
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Figure 3: Framework for understanding the effect of misspecification 
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Table 1A. Value loss, over-specified representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode 
Performance with 
correct view 
Performance with 
over-specified view 
% value loss 
Pattern 1 Modular 0.991 0.949 -4.1% 
 
Self-Governing  0.993 0.927 -6.8% 
 
Ratification 0.993 0.912 -8.0% 
 
Integrated 0.989 0.926 -6.4% 
Pattern 2 Modular 0.948 0.771 -18.6% 
 
Self-Governing  0.989 0.842 -15.0% 
 
Ratification 0.989 0.802 -18.8% 
 
Integrated 0.986 0.785 -20.0% 
Pattern 3 Modular 0.950 0.783 -17.0% 
 
Self-Governing  0.932 0.793 -14.9% 
 
Ratification 0.908 0.765 -15.2% 
 
Integrated 0.949 0.763 -19.5% 
Pattern 4  Modular 0.884 0.747 -14.8% 
 
Self-Governing  0.884 0.845 -4.6% 
 
Ratification 0.879 0.803 -8.3% 
 
Integrated 0.922 0.816 -11.3% 
 
Table 1B. Value loss, under-specified representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode 
Performance with 
correct view 
Performance with 
over-specified view 
% value loss 
Pattern 2 Modular 0.944 0.921 -2.6% 
 
Self-Governing  0.990 0.928 -6.2% 
 
Ratification 0.990 0.918 -7.2% 
 
Integrated 0.985 0.919 -6.6% 
Pattern 3 Modular 0.950 0.773 -19.1% 
 
Self-Governing  0.931 0.773 -17.3% 
 
Ratification 0.902 0.770 -15.6% 
 
Integrated 0.949 0.751 -21.6% 
Pattern 4 Modular 0.873 0.745 -15.6% 
 
Self-Governing  0.884 0.795 -10.3% 
 
Ratification 0.877 0.755 -14.7% 
 
Integrated 0.927 0.749 -19.0% 
Pattern 5 Modular 0.747 0.808 7.8% 
 
Self-Governing  0.828 0.829 -1.0% 
 
Ratification 0.780 0.757 -2.5% 
 
Integrated 0.910 0.823 -9.5% 
 
Note: Values in bold indicate the governance mode providing superior performance for each combination of pattern 
and managerial representation (either correct or misspecified). For example, in Table 1A, with the combination of 
[Pattern 1, Correct View], both the self-governing and ratification modes provide the highest performance. 
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Table 2A: Changes in coordination and exploration, over-specified representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode 
Symmetric view Asymmetric view 
Exploration Coordination Exploration Coordination 
Pattern 1 Modular 0.9% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 
 
Self-Governing  3.4% 0.0% -0.9% 0.0% 
 
Ratification 2.3% 0.0% -0.6% 0.0% 
 
Integrated 1.6% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 2 Modular 0.6% -14.3% 1.6% -5.6% 
 
Self-Governing  5.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
 
Ratification 0.5% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 
 
Integrated 1.8% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 3 Modular 7.7% 0.1% 2.6% 2.4% 
 
Self-Governing  9.4% 3.5% 0.9% 1.0% 
 
Ratification 0.2% 6.2% -0.3% 5.9% 
 
Integrated 3.7% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 4  Modular 3.4% -0.5% 0.7% 2.5% 
 
Self-Governing  0.5% 1.6% 0.4% 0.9% 
 
Ratification 0.3% 3.9% 0.0% 4.1% 
 
Integrated 1.6% 0.0% - - 
 
Table 2B: Changes in coordination and exploration, under-specified representation 
Underlying 
pattern 
Governance 
mode 
Symmetric view Asymmetric view 
Exploration Coordination Exploration Coordination 
Pattern 2 Modular -1.4% -11.7% -0.5% -10.0% 
 
Self-Governing  0.6% 0.0% -1.6% 0.0% 
 
Ratification 0.1% 0.0% -1.4% 0.0% 
 
Integrated -1.2% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 3 Modular 2.3% 1.1% 0.1% 1.0% 
 
Self-Governing  -1.8% 3.4% -0.8% 0.5% 
 
Ratification 1.3% 5.1% 0.1% 3.6% 
 
Integrated 3.0% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 4 Modular -2.1% -11.0% -1.8% -8.7% 
 
Self-Governing  -0.6% 2.4% -0.5% 0.1% 
 
Ratification 0.0% 4.6% -0.1% 0.9% 
 
Integrated 1.1% 0.0% - - 
Pattern 5  Modular -2.6% -24.3% -1.7% -17.6% 
 
Self-Governing  -1.3% -1.1% -0.9% -1.8% 
 
Ratification -0.6% -13.9% -0.4% -12.1% 
 
Integrated 0.0% 0.0% - - 
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Table 3: Effect of misspecification on exploration, coordination failure and total profits 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable 
(all dummy variables 
except for constant) 
Model 1 
(Over-
specification) 
Model 2 
(Under-
specification) 
Exploration Misspecification 0.098 -0.009 
 Self-governing -0.147 -0.221 
 Ratification -0.234 -0.250 
 Integrated 1.055 0.787 
 Pattern 1 0.293  
 Pattern 3 -1.053 -1.328 
 Pattern 4 -1.629 -1.958 
 Pattern 5  -1.988 
 Constant 0.379 1.244 
 
 
R
2 
0.874 0.818 
Coord. failures Misspecification 0.003 -0.193 
 Self-governing -0.694 -0.801 
 Ratification -0.600 -0.561 
 Integrated -0.768 -0.916 
 Pattern 1 -0.278  
 Pattern 3 -0.077 -0.081 
 Pattern 4 0.282 0.117 
 Pattern 5  0.478 
 Constant 0.532 0.537 
 R
2
 0.132 0.179 
Performance  Exploration 0.383 0.459 
 Coordination failures -0.212 -0.375 
 Misspecification -1.116 -0.830 
 Self-governing 0.116 0.012 
 Ratification -0.005 -0.127 
 Integrated -0.423 -0.445 
 Constant 0.636 0.555 
 R
2
 0.413 0.390 
 Observations 320,000 320,000 
 
Note: All independent variables are dummy variables, except for exploration, coordination failures, and the 
constant. The misspecification dummy variable refers to the over-specified view for Model 1 and to the under-
specified view for Model 2. 
 
